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Abstract 
In this article we develop the notion of the technology-media-movement complex (TMMC) as a field-
definition statement for ongoing inquiry into the use of information and communication technologies 
(ICTs) in social and political movements. We consider the definitions and boundaries of the TMMC, 
arguing particularly for an historically-rooted conception of technological development that allows 
better integration of the different intellectual traditions that are currently focused on the same set of 
empirical phenomena. We then delineate two recurrent debates in the literature highlighting their 
contributions to emerging knowledge. The first debate concerns the divide between scholars who 
privilege media technologies, and see them as driving forces of movement dynamics, and those who 
privilege media practices over affordances. The second debate broadly opposes theorists who believe 
in the emancipatory potential of ICTs and those who highlight the ways they are used to repress social 
movements and grassroots mobilization. By mapping positions in these debates to the TMMC we 
identify and provide direction to three broad research areas which demand further consideration: (i) 
questions of power and agency in social movements; (ii) the relationships between, on the one hand, 
social movements and technology and media as politics ( i.e. cyberpolitics and technopolitics), and on 
the other, the quotidian and ubiquitous use of digital tools in a digital age; and (iii) the significance of 
digital divides that cut across and beyond social movements, particularly in the way such divisions may 
overlay existing power relations in movements. In conclusion, we delineate six challenges for 
profitable further research on the TMMC.  
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Navigating the Technology-Media-Movements 
Complex 
Cristina Flesher Fominaya and Kevin Gillan  
 
The use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) in social and political 
movements is an ongoing and rich area of inquiry. Research work draws from several 
social scientific fields including movement scholarship, information and communications 
studies and media research. Our purpose in this article is to set out a general framework 
within which to navigate this field of inquiry. We begin by developing the notion of the 
technology-media-movement complex (TMMC) as a field-definition statement, allowing for 
better integration of the different intellectual traditions that are currently focused on the 
same set of empirical phenomena. We thereby introduce the essential features required 
for further rigorous knowledge generation in this area. In our first section we consider 
the definitions and boundaries of the TMMC, arguing particularly for an historically-
rooted conception of technological development and an approach to ‘novelty’ that 
recognises it as a continually reproduced feature of the TMMC, rather than as a 
technologically driven, momentary historical break.  We describe potential routes for 
integration of approaches from various fields and disciplines -- including political 
communication, media studies, technology studies, organizational studies and social 
psychology -- whose insights can be fruitfully applied to analysis of the nexus between 
technology, media, and social movements.  In the second section we delineate two 
recurrent debates. First, we examine the tension between accounts that privilege 
technology or social agency as drivers of social change, arguing that what has to be 
analysed is the interplay of collective processes, pre-existing political commitments, 
technological competences, and technical affordances. This approach recognizes the 
creative and strategic agency of social movement actors. Second, we outline debates 
between scholars who emphasize the emancipatory potential of digital technology and 
those who are much less sanguine about its liberating potential.  We highlight the real 
insights that proponents of divergent positions have offered the field, but note the need 
for nuanced accounts of empirical reality to test the veracity of competing visions of 
digital futures.  
In our third section we consider three areas of inquiry within the TMMC that merit 
further consideration. First, we consider differing conceptions of social movements and 
the implications of each position for navigating the TMMC, distinguishing between 
individual agglomerate, collective, and network analyses. Second, we consider the 
distinction between scholarship on social movements that engage with technology and 
media as politics (i.e. cyberpolitics and technopolitics) and those that focus on the 
quotidian and ubiquitous use of digital tools in a digital age, highlighting the need for 
more research on how these different understandings of the role of digital tools 
reciprocally influence each other in movement practice. Third, we examine the digital 
divide. Rather than seeing this simply as a matter of global inequalities of access to 
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technology, we argue that complex forms of digitally-mediated exclusion exist within 
cyberspace and social movements and call for further research on the way these divisions 
overlay existing power relations on and offline. In this way we call attention to the need 
to pay more attention to lived experience and power in our analysis of the TMMC.  In 
conclusion, we draw from the conceptual contributions of this article to set out six 
challenges for further research on the TMMC. 
Boundaries and definitions: technology, media, movements 
The study of ICTs and social movements is not (yet) an integrated subfield. There are two 
important reasons for the diffuse nature of inquiry in this area. The first is that 
empirically-led studies are often understandably interested in delineating the uptake of 
specific new technologies within social movements. Email, IRC channels, websites, pirate 
radio, mobile phones, live streaming, social media platforms; the list is potentially endless 
as new communicative technologies become available. From an empirical point of view 
one often wants to examine questions such as what ways are specific technologies put to 
use within particular movements, what they can contribute to mobilization or 
contestation, or what limitations might they place on actors. At this level, it is difficult to 
find broad applicability in answers to such questions. Differences in both underlying 
technological design and the political contexts in which they are adopted suggest that 
there is little hope that single cases will offer many general lessons without more 
concerted efforts at theoretical development. The result is that, for each technological 
innovation – now social media, previously, the Web, email, television and so on – there 
has been a tendency to cycle through a particular kind of unproductive debate: optimists 
see radical democratizing potential, pessimists see the reconfiguration of traditional 
power structures in a new arena, while others seek a middle ground.  
A second barrier to integration in this area of inquiry is the fact that it necessarily draws 
on different fields. There is much productive potential in bringing these fields together, 
especially by combining insights from movement scholarship with those of (political) 
communication (Earl & Garett, this issue), media studies (Mattoni, this issue) and 
technologies studies (Pavan, this issue). At present, however, it is more a case of separate 
lines of inquiry with only occasional intersections. As movement scholars writing in 
Social Movement Studies we, and several contributors to the issue, tend to examine ICTs 
through the conceptual frameworks developed in this field and address questions 
concerning the utility or otherwise provided in central movement processes such as the 
communication of movement frames, the generation of collective identities, or the 
production of movement resources. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that this movement-
centrism is field-specific; elsewhere, Gillan has adopted frameworks drawing more from 
technology studies (2008) or political communication (Gibson et al, 2013), whereas 
Flesher Fominaya (2016) has drawn on insights from human-computer interaction 
studies and social-psychology to apply them to analysis of the TMMC. A vital first step in 
enabling positive cross-field developments is a more clearly defined statement of the 
particular complex of phenomena that has generated such a strong flow of research 
publications in recent years, namely: technology, media, and movements (or TMMC). We 
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specify each in the following paragraphs.  
For technology, ICTs are the core focus. It is these technologies in particular that have 
been the subject of so much innovation and excitement since the personal computers of 
the early 1960s, but especially since the creation of two major communication 
infrastructures: mobile phone networks beginning in the 1960s and the internet (and 
various nationally specific variants) in the 1980s. A technologically vital and more recent 
process here is widespread digitisation. Spurred by the characteristics of microchip 
processing and the internet, the more that data is available in digital form the more it can 
be transformed and communicated. This is not a trivial technological outcome. The first 
mobile phone networks, drawing from their obvious predecessors on landlines, were 
analogue communication systems and only became digitised with the ‘second generation’ 
EU-led GSM protocol deployed from the early 1990s, which not incidentally made short 
message service (SMS) texting feasible (Castells et al. 2006). Without the digitisation 
pathway, powerful and emotive imagery, audio and video would have been much harder 
to share online; and the visual language of contemporary information flows potentially 
changes the nature of the public sphere in which much movement communication is 
located (DeLuca and Peeples, 2002). Perhaps more fundamentally, without the 
digitisation of mobile networks the convergence between mobile phones and internet 
devices - creating complex hybrid spaces that intertwine the informational and the 
physical - would have been practically impossible (see De Souza e Silva 2006; Gordon 
2006). From a communications angle, without decades of SMS texts it seems unlikely that 
many users would have found interaction through Twitter’s 144-character messaging 
interface appealing or even coherent; the development of cultural competencies in ICT 
use is just as vital as technological affordances. It is the particular combination of internet 
and mobile infrastructures that is the source of a sense of the supposed ‘ubiquity’ of 
technologically-mediated communication, which we explore further below.  
It is not all ICTs, then, but specifically those ICTs which enable rapid, low-cost networked 
communication among individuals that have been the vital technologies studied by 
scholars interested in the TMMC. Understanding the characteristics of the technologies 
involved is important; not because social outcomes are entirely technologically 
determined, of course, but because design characteristics create affordances that might or 
might not be adopted by thinking, feeling agents in specific circumstances. Here, insights 
from human-computer interaction studies and social psychological work on the 
experience of technology use are particularly helpful (e.g. Kiesler and Sproull 1992; 
Spears, Lea, and Corneliussen 2002; Lea and Spears 1991; Hargittai and Shafer 2006; 
Garton and Wellman 1995). Agentic processes are evident when, for instance, individuals 
and groups carry out interpretative work in examining the potential utility of affordances, 
and may even find ways of reshaping them (within limits) for purposes for which they 
were never intended (Himanen 2001; Gillan 2008). Yet such actions are hardly 
unconstrained: skill, time, and other resources are required to bring out the ‘latent 
functionalities’ of the technologies made available through (mostly) market means for 
(mostly) corporate ends (Gillan et al. 2008: 172-181). Further understanding of the role 
of ICTs in the TMMC may depend on making more use of social theories of technology in 
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which a nuanced approach to both social agency and the political character of 
technological design are central (e.g. Feenberg 2002; Kirkpatrick 2008; Redshaw 2017; 
Pavan this issue).  
Within the investigation of ICTs and movements, technologies are primarily of interest 
because of their role in mediating communication, hence the focus on media in the TMMC. 
From a pure technology studies approach, other developments may be more crucial. The 
invention of, for instance, the TCP/IP protocols (that manage the packaging, addressing, 
and transmission of digital data) enabled the construction of the internet on top of copper 
cables that had previously been intended for analogue telephone signals; this must count 
as one of the most significant hacks in history. Such protocols, and indeed the material 
hardware required (and usually privately owned), are potentially relevant ‘mediators’ of 
regular communication (Lessig 2002). For our concerns, however, such developments are 
mostly mere background, too far from the practicalities of mediated communication to 
have much obvious relevance. Thus technology is primarily of interest in its 
interrelationship with ‘media’ in our conception of the TMMC.  
There are two senses in which ‘media’ can be rendered here. The first refers to the 
insertion of the ICTs delineated above into movement-relevant communications. The 
specific characteristics of communication as mediated by particular technological 
infrastructures presents challenges and limitations for social movement groups as is 
found by various studies of the affordances of such mediation (Flesher Fominaya 2016; 
Tufekci 2014a; Milan 2015; Gillan 2009; Wall 2007). The term ‘new media’ has been 
adopted in many studies to refer to this collection of technological innovations, defined 
through the following characteristics: their hybrid or recombinant formations, bringing 
together pre-existing technologies in a range of innovative ways; their contribution to the 
development of communication systems as ‘reorganizing, unfolding […] networks of 
networks’ structured centrally on hyperlinks; and their enabling of on-demand access to 
information (Lievrouw 2011:8-16). The result is a sense of ‘ubiquity’ of information via 
new media, seemingly offering users ‘an unprecedented degree of selectivity and reach in 
their choices of information and cultural resources and their personal interactions and 
expressions’ (ibid). So defined, the term ‘new media’ remains a useful referent point 
because it is general enough to encompass both the ‘older’ web technologies (e.g. email, 
websites, blogs) and the growing raft of new applications of new media information 
networks (e.g. social media, live streaming) that come along as mobile devices with 
expanded capabilities and near-permanent internet access have been more widely 
adopted (see also Siapera 2012).  
The notion of ‘newness’ is worth further consideration. As Lievrouw and others have 
indicated, there is genuine novelty to the forms of communication network now in wide 
use. But there is also a tendency to fixate on the newest formations capturing the 
imagination of technology enthusiasts. This can lead to a form of ‘myopia of the present’ 
(Melucci 1994) which doesn’t situate media technology use within a longer term 
perspective, and can ignore the ways that newer media forms evolve from previous forms 
and practice. It also leads to a form of presentism that fails to acknowledge the dynamic 
nature of technological advances in which particular platforms and their affordances – 
 Cristina Flesher Fominaya & Kevin Gillan, 2017  6 
however important they might be now – may soon become modified, obsolete, or 
replaced by other forms of media; or conversely how platforms used only by specialized 
activists today may become widespread tomorrow. The myopia of the present, therefore, 
doesn’t just relate to the past but to the future. Thus we need to be able to resist the 
tendency to see each technological development as radically new, as this makes it difficult 
to spot underlying commonalities in the nature of communications, technological 
adoptions, agencies, and power.  
We do not make this point to deny the novelty of new media. Indeed, over recent decades 
we have seen changes in communication, self-expression, collective identity formation, 
personal network building, and activist communications strategies as a result of the 
increasingly digitally-mediated nature of the everyday lives of increasing numbers of 
people. However, one could not define a single innovation or a single moment at which 
there is a distinct break from the past (see also Ganesh and Stohl 2013); instead we see 
the sometimes-fast, sometimes-slow build-up of new forms of technology alongside, 
crucially, the cultural competencies, practices, and preferences required to make sense 
and use of them (e.g. Costanza-Chock 2012). The novelty of ‘new media’ is thus less about 
a moment of change (and therefore is not a clear distinction between old and new) and 
much more about the fact that the production of novelties is now built into a system that 
is defined, as noted above, by the construction of hybrid and recombinant technological 
formations. Much as Daniel Bell (1974) noted the importance of planned research and 
development in corporate infrastructures in the changing timescale of innovation in 
business, we can see that today we have a networked information infrastructure that 
results in rapid, repeated moments of innovation that can change the characteristics and 
uses of the network itself.   
‘Media’ in the TMMC thus refers in one sense to the role of technological mediation in 
communication between individuals and groups that make movements happen. But there 
is also a second, more general, sense in which ‘media’ is vital. This refers to the 
institutions of traditional news media (sometimes erroneously referred to as ‘old media’) 
– whether distributed via newspapers, television or the internet – through which all 
political actors gain key information. This is a significant point of intersection with the 
field of political communications (Earl & Garett, this issue) as well as media studies 
(Mattoni, this issue). The importance for social movements of finding representation in 
dominant news media outlets has long been studied, especially among those interested in 
processes of interpretative framing (Ryan 1991; Smith et al. 2001; e.g. McCarthy, Smith, 
and Zald 1996; Oliver and Maney 2000; Gitlin 2003).1 The more recent entanglement 
between news media and the ‘new media’ generated by the technological developments 
indicated above, however, complicate simple models of movement groups as ‘outsiders’ 
trying to gain entry to a hegemonic news agenda. In addition to our analyses of the 
mediated nature of group communication per se, therefore, we need to maintain an 
analytic gaze on the ongoing influence of those institutions which generate, select, frame, 
                                                        
1 For an overview of the relation between mass media and social movements, see Flesher Fominaya 2014, 
Ch. 6 
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and disseminate ‘the news’. Those institutions are often significantly controlled by state 
agencies or megalithic corporations and are now very large presences in ‘new media’ too, 
both in terms of size of websites and user traffic. Nevertheless, in the contemporary 
‘media ecology’ (Mattoni, this issue; 2012) they become increasingly integrated with 
other circuits of information diffusion, especially those that present themselves as neutral 
‘platforms’ (Gillespie 2010), potentially making for a more responsive and diverse (if 
rather cacophonous) information environment.  The apparent influence of ‘alternative’ 
news sources such as Breitbart in the recent US Presidential Election campaign and the 
related fears that we now live in a world of ‘post-truth politics’ are clear indicators of the 
potential for surprise extant in this complex information environment. 
We have thus far bounded the TMMC by specifying the relationship between particular 
ICTs and their role in mediation – both of communication within networks and in their 
role in constituting the wider media ecology. The final boundary-drawing task is thus to 
specify how these connect with social movements. While we do not wish to get fully 
entangled in the ‘what is a social movement?’ question here (for some direct answers see 
Johnston 2014), in defining the TMMC it is necessary to offer some definitional clarity. 
For us, the definitional features of ‘social movement’ must minimally include a degree 
collectivity through voluntary coordination of activity in the pursuit of values or interests 
that produce conflict with other social actors (Gillan forthcoming). The processes by 
which individuals come together, recognise common experiences of social problems, 
develop diagnoses of those problems, and begin to form strategies to attempt to 
overcome them remain, in our view, inherently collective. To identify a social movement 
is to prioritise processes that are inherently, and largely intentionally, collective in 
nature. The division between more individual and more collective approaches to the 
TMMC highlights a significant analytical question to which we return in the next section.  
We have so far defined the core elements of the TMMC, identifying the empirical 
phenomena of interest by considering the intersection of technology, media, and 
movements. In doing so, we have highlighted especially the need to draw on insights from 
fields beyond our immediate frames of reference as social movement scholars. This 
approach is likely to yield fruitful analyses of the crucial puzzles and challenges facing 
social movements and scholars today. By arguing against a ‘myopia of the present’ we 
present a vision of novelty that is not the result of a particular historical break, but rather 
a result of varying combinations of movement action, media work, and technological play 
which enable the dynamic complexity of the TMMC; the tendency to reification of novelty 
is rendered as problematic. We now move on to consider two core analytical debates and 
approaches to the TMMC, before considering three vital areas for further research.  
Core Debates on the TMMC  
By defining the TMMC above, we offered some descriptive boundaries of the empirical 
phenomena of interest to those working under the broad heading of ‘ICTs and 
movements’. We now outline two recurrent core debates: the first between those who 
privilege either technology or social agency as drivers of mobilization; and the second 
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between those who privilege the emancipatory versus repressive potentials of ICTs. 
Technologically or Socially-driven Changes? 
While most scholars are sensitive to critiques of technological determinism, there is a 
continuum within the field from scholars who tend to privilege technologies and see them 
as driving forces of movements, among other major dynamics (e.g. Rheingold 1993, 
Shirky 2009; Benkler 2006; Bennett and Segerberg 2013), to those that keep their focus 
on social actors and the ways that they deploy these technologies, through privileging 
media practices over affordances (see Mattoni, this issue; Mattoni 2012, Flesher 
Fominaya 2014). It is undeniable that the advent of cyberspace has created an arena 
encompassing significant new elements in the forms and consequences of political 
communication, political engagement, and political conflict. Simultaneously, it is 
impossible to see these developments as a singular causal force in the production of 
movement mobilization or outcomes. Castells argues that online social networks are 
‘tools at the disposal of any individual or self-created network of individuals who want to 
have their views aired … the diffusion of Internet-based social networks is a necessary 
condition for the existence of these new social movements in our time. But it is not a 
sufficient condition’ (Castells 2015: 226).  Castells makes this point specifically for the 
category of ‘new networked social movements’, which emerges from his analysis of the 
post-2010 movements; he rightly recognises that there are other forms of movement for 
which particular technologies cannot be considered a necessary condition.  
Given that neither technology nor any single actor can be understood as sole driving force 
in the TMMC, what has to be specified is the interplay of collective processes, pre-existing 
political commitments, technological competencies, and technical affordances, in which it 
becomes possible to recognize the creative and strategic agency of social movement 
actors. Two examples illuminate this point.  Firstly, Bitcoin is an alternative currency 
based on the coming together of several key advances in highly complex uses of network 
technologies. The ‘mining’ of Bitcoin is built into the technological design as an incentive 
structure in which early adopters were able to receive currency by running fast 
computers to solve complex mathematical problems that served the needs of the 
network. A designed-in reduction of the rate of currency growth means that eventually 
the energy costs of running mining software would outstrip the value of the mined coins 
(Redshaw 2017: 55-6). That is to say, technological adeptness combined with access to 
material resources allowed the production of wealth for a clique of interested parties. As 
Redshaw (2017) reveals, a libertarian attitude drawn from ‘cypherpunks’ was embedded 
in the purpose and design of the technology from the start. While this has been contested 
during technical development, there was a neatness of fit between libertarian 
technological design and the rising interest in Bitcoin from people whose ideological 
commitment was to a Hayekian ‘denationalization of money’. This demonstrates: firstly, 
that the exercise of technological agency need not be democratic in nature; secondly, that 
the significance of Bitcoin can only be understood in relation to cultural preferences and 
practices alongside technological competence and material capability.    
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A second example of technological-social interplay comes from Uitermark’s study of 
Anonymous (this issue) in which access to and adeptness with particular technologies are 
characteristics that shape power dynamics within that group; a form of internal digital 
divide that we explore further below. Because Uitermark’s approach is ethnographic he is 
able to see beyond the characteristics of communication shaped by technological design 
to the social forces at play in generating power structures among a nominally 
horizontally-organised and leaderless group. We see some mirroring of the long-known 
‘tyranny of structurelessness’ (Freeman 1972) here, but also other characteristics - such 
as the problematically ‘thin’ degree of shared political identity - that must finally be 
understood as shaped by location of Anonymous within the TMMC. In other words, 
specific technologies shape the precise form these power plays manifest, but the 
dynamics they reflect echo longstanding social movement conflicts and challenges.  
Both examples suggest that there is nothing inherently progressive or democratic about 
technologies, such qualities are only made manifest in the use to which they are put, and 
even the best intentions can lead to unintended consequences; this insight underlies our 
position on the next recurrent debate within scholarship on the TMMC. 
Emancipation and Repression 
Scholarly debate has distinguished theorists who believe in the emancipatory potential of 
new ICTs from those who are much less sanguine about their possibilities and who 
highlight the ways that political and economic elites and the state use these technologies 
to control, surveil, and limit the power of social movements and grassroots mobilization. 
‘Techno-utopianism’ was a feature of rising initial excitement as new ICTs became 
widespread, with Rheingold (1993:14) defining the political significance of ICTs as lying 
in their ‘capacity to challenge the existing political hierarchies’ monopoly on powerful 
communications media, and perhaps has revitalized citizen-based democracy’ (also 
Shirky 2009; Benkler 2006). The idea that the architecture of internet communication 
carries inherent democratic potential is now widely seen as naive (and is countered by 
our two examples above), but opposing this with a ‘techno-pessimism’ or ‘cyber-
skepticism’ would be similarly over-simplistic, and simply ‘contribute further 
ammunition to the tiresome binary debate’ (Dencik and Leistert 2015: 2). In fact, it is only 
logically possible to come to a pure ‘techno-utopian’ or ‘cyber-skeptic’ position on the 
basis of a uni-causal technological determinism; otherwise social processes of 
interpretation, interaction, the exercise of power and identity formation will inevitably 
confound the theorists’ predictions. The questions for analyses of the TMMC are instead, 
therefore, in what ways might the interplay of technological development and social 
action achieve democratic visions, and in what ways does it produce barriers through 
repression? 
Morozov (2011) argues that while the Internet can serve a democratic function, not 
enough attention is being paid to how states have used it as a tool of repression and 
control; nor how much of the cutting-edge research used to develop tools such as face 
recognition software, sophisticated user content analysis, and social media analysis has 
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been harnessed by governments to repress and censor dissidents, and control citizen 
access to online content. Margolis and Resnick (2000) argue that political players with 
power in ‘the real world’ (offline) can also gain the upper hand in cyberspace. Tufekci 
(2015) further alerts us to the ways that corporate owned social media poses significant 
risks to democracy, including electoral processes, through their ability to modify their 
algorithms to manipulate and bias information that users see. The extent to which these 
corporate ‘psycho technologies’ can be used to manipulate not only users’ impressions 
but also their emotions, allied to the opacity of data mining practices and its uses by 
corporate platform owners, suggests a need to pay increased attention to the negative 
implications for social movement actors (see e.g. Leistert 2015). 
The increasing reliance on corporate-controlled spaces for activist communication raises 
critical questions for movements working against neoliberal global capitalism or who are 
committed to critiquing and contesting political and economic elites (Hintz 2015). The 
dangers posed by public discussions, organizations, and networks being observed, 
monitored, archived, and censored by corporate enterprises has serious implications for 
cyber activism and for social movement organizing online (Askanius and Gustafson 2010, 
Flesher Fominaya 2014). Stoycheff and Nisbet discuss the ways in which authoritarian 
governments not only restrict internet freedoms, particularly to political content, but also 
establish ‘“psychological firewalls” that paint the internet as a scary world full of political 
threats. This rationale increases threat perceptions among the public. This, in turn, 
increases the public’s support for online political censorship’ (2016: n.p.). The authors 
highlight the limitations of techno-deterministic narratives that assume technological 
affordances will shape use: as they argue, we need to dispense once and for all with ‘the 
“if we build it, they will come” philosophy underlying a great deal of internet freedom 
promotion [that] doesn’t take into account basic human psychology in which 
entertainment choices are preferred over news and attitudes toward the internet 
determine its use, not the technology itself’ (ibid.) Remembering too that media-based 
tactics such as political culture jamming are not limited to progressive radical grassroots 
social movements but can be used by political and social movement actors on any point of 
the spectrum, as well as by political parties and corporate actors, acts as a corrective to 
overly optimistic narratives about the emancipatory potential of new media.  
Whistleblowing projects like Wikileaks and Xnet have demonstrated the capacity for 
small organized groups to pose significant challenges to powerful elites and states. The 
recent examples of the role of ‘fake news’ and hacking exposés in the Clinton/Trump 
electoral race, however, show that drawing a neat distinction between elites and 
grassroots actors is not simple, and the debate over the legitimacy of Wikileaks, an 
influential and at times widely admired group, shows how complex disentangling ‘sides’ - 
top/bottom, us/them, progressive/reactionary - and motives can be (see also Gallo-Cruz 
2016). What is clear is that any analysis of ICTs and social movements needs to be aware 
that the political cultures tied to internet use matter, and that the state can and does play 
an important role in structuring a context which can foster or prevent movements’ ability 
to use ICTs effectively. Rather than situate themselves on one side or the other of this 
debate, most scholars now recognize the tension between emancipatory and repressive 
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tendencies, a tension inherent in the network architecture of digital communication itself 
(e.g. Castells, 2009, 2012 Dencik and Leistert, 2015, Jordan 2015, Lievrouw 2011).  
Power, Politics and Agency in the Digital Age 
We have thus far described two continua on which current debates around the TMMC can 
be organised. These positions are likely shaped, but not necessarily determined, by the 
pre-existing ontological and epistemological commitments or methodological choices 
which underpin them (on which more below). We have argued that in navigating the 
TMMC we must understand new technologies as always (and already) enmeshed within 
social processes. Neither technological design, nor decisions on adoption, can float freely 
of the actors participating in those processes. From that position it is only logical to 
understand the potential for either emancipatory or repressive outcomes as continuously 
unfolding and contested, a matter for empirical evaluation rather than theoretical fiat or 
rhetorical pronouncement. From this position, we now detail three areas in which further 
scholarly work is required for a better understanding of the interplay of technological 
and social processes in the TMMC: 1) attempts to embed both individual action and 
collectives within a socio-political context alive to power relations; 2) differentiation of 
‘cyberpolitics’ and its influence (or otherwise) from quotidian ICT use; and 3) 
understanding the ongoing relevance of digital divides and dimensions of power on social 
movements. 
Individuals, Collectives, Networks 
Some scholars approach social movements as an agglomeration of individual behaviours. 
To some extent this follows in the footsteps of Olson’s (1965) seminal treatment of 
collective action: reducing it to the behaviours and preferences of rational individuals 
highlights the need for cooperation in formal institutions to overcome the free rider 
problem. Here, there is an ease of fit between the aggregation of individual action and the 
methodological possibilities enabled by access to social media data, since that data is 
generally interpreted at the level of the individual (albeit located in networks of 
interaction). Thus predictive-explanatory models, sometimes with experimental designs, 
analyse online individual behaviour in order to explain mobilization without recourse to 
direct observation of, or contact with, mobilizing groups (but see Mercea and Yilmaz 
2017 for an alternative social learning process based on formal modelling of individual 
actions).  
Margetts and John (2015), for example, use experimental data to analyse and predict the 
role of social media in mass mobilizations, like Spain’s 15-M or Egypt’s Revolution.  A core 
part of the data that shapes their model comes from online petitions, although that form 
of action cannot be reliably used to predict or explain other forms of mobilization (e.g. 
high risk protest where issues of trust, solidarity, and emotion work are brought to bear 
on individual decisions to participate). From these formal models and experimental 
designs they argue that social media enables ‘mobilizations without leaders, revolutions 
without organizations’ in line with arguments put forward by Bennett and Segerberg 
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(2013). Bennett and Segerberg furthermore link the advent of social media use to an 
increase in individualization in society, thereby aligning method and theory. In these 
approaches, contextual factors are treated as less important than individual actions 
(petition signing, voting, clicking, liking, sharing, and so on), or else context is seen as 
influencing individual rather than collective behaviour (e.g. Hwang et al. 2006; Brym et al. 
2014).  
In contrast to work adopting a summative individual agglomeration model of action, 
scholars adopting a collective action approach see social movements as necessarily 
involving meaningful and extended collective processes of interaction and reciprocal 
engagement of groups of people tied together in networks or fields of action.  Such 
approaches are more likely to understand ICT adoption in movements as shaped by 
specific media ecologies, cultural repertoires, collective ideational frameworks, and 
subject to the dynamics of collective decision-making, including political communication 
strategies, protocols, and ethics (e.g. Mattoni, this issue; Hensby this issue; Flesher 
Fominaya 2016; Kavada 2015, 2009; Firer-Blaess 2016; Coleman 2010, 2012; Milan 
2013). Scholars working from this point of departure often require methodologies that 
involve qualitative engagement with, or observation of, internal movement processes and 
dynamics. Whereas the former approach focuses primarily or exclusively on mobilization 
(often of low cost activities), the latter see this as only one part of what social movements 
do and extend analysis of media use to internal organizational and communication 
processes as well as external ones.  
The relevance of socio-political context becomes particularly salient when analyzing 
collective processes, whether enacted online or off. In work on the TMMC, that context – 
whether theorised as a relatively static opportunity structure or something more 
dynamic – is heavily shaped by the shifting landscape of technology and media described 
above, potentially reflecting back on the nature of collectives created (Dolata & Schrape 
2016). As Mattoni (this issue) highlights, a media ecology approach recognizes not only 
the complexity of media use by movements (i.e. the full range of media practices and the 
cultural and political rationales that drive them) but also the wider media context within 
which they operate. This wider media context is itself open to modification by social 
movement actors themselves, especially those engaged in critical media practices: for 
example, as Flesher Fominaya’s research shows,2 Spain’s 15-M movement not only 
effectively mobilized multiple digital media tools, but provided a support base and 
impetus for the development of various critical media initiatives that attempted to put 
into practice alternative media business models (based on collective ownership, 
subscriptions and crowd funding). While some such initiatives existed prior to 15-M (e.g. 
critical collectively produced newspaper Diagonal), the supply of and demand for 
independent critical media increased in a virtuous circle, with mobilization enabling the 
                                                        
2 Marie Sklodowska-Curie Research Project ‘Contentious Politics in an Age of Austerity: A comparative 
study of anti-austerity protests in Spain and Ireland’ (2013–2015). This research involved extensive 
participant observation, over 70 interviews and secondary data analysis. 
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emergence of independent critical ‘mass’ media, thus altering the media ecology of 
political communication in Spain in significant ways (see also Casero-Ripollés and 
Feenstra 2012). The new independent, largely worker-owned, critical media consortium 
‘El Salto’, for example, has significant implications for social movement communication 
(in that the consortium is committed to covering issues related to progressive social 
movements), but also represents a radical media movement process in and of itself. 
Improving understanding of the dynamic interplay between different but overlapping 
movement groups and their ‘contexts’ is vital, then, and more likely to emerge from 
analytical perspectives that begin with a critical approach to the construction of 
movements as collectives. 
The division we have set out between more individualist and more collective units of 
analysis is often reflective of background ontological positions and methodological 
choices, but this is not necessarily an insuperable dualism. Two directions for further 
thought emerge from the contributions to this volume. Firstly, Ahmed et al. take an 
interesting step in analysing the emotional valence of tweets surrounding the Nirbhaya 
movement reacting to a gang-rape incident in Delhi. Here they code tweets for the sense 
of ‘individualism’ or ‘collectivism’ portrayed in the text. Thus the degree of collectivism 
experienced in the movement becomes an empirical question for analysis rather than a 
matter of theoretical standpoint. Secondly, Uitermark utilises complexity theory in his 
investigation of Anonymous, allowing a nuanced account of the development of power 
structures in an especially individualised and supposedly horizontal forum.  While 
Uitermark argues that movements are agglomerates beyond the control of any individual 
or group, he also argues that they are defined by their capacity to self-organize and are 
essentially ‘generative, creative and transgressive’. Complexity theory potentially offers a 
way of understanding collective activity as emergent from relational processes among 
individuals (c.f. Chesters & Welsh 2006). Again, one might start from the need to 
empirically examine degrees of collectivity to understand the ways in which emergence 
might operate in the TMMC. Anonymous is perhaps at the boundaries of what one might 
consider a ‘movement’ in any traditional sense and that makes questions about the 
relationship between the individual and collective especially sharp. Similarly, studies that 
begin with social media activity or other communicative media may end up examining 
primarily activity that is connected, but not necessarily central to, the traditional ‘stuff’ of 
movements. These insights are pertinent to continue thinking through what is at stake in 
taking particular sets of individual practices as indicative of social movements per se.  
A further way to overcome the danger of a dualism between more individualistic or more 
collectivist approaches lies in a focus on networks and the relationships of which they are 
composed. While formal network analyses have become increasingly popular in social 
movement scholarship more broadly (e.g. Diani and McAdam 2003; Krinsky and Crossley 
2014), the network approach becomes most obviously relevant to the TMMC through 
Castells’ (1996) conception of the network society. This opens up questions of power and 
culture that are especially significant. Castells has argued that power is exercised through 
networks in a number of ways: controlling access to, or exclusion from, particular 
networks; programming the purpose of networks; or controlling the connections 
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between multiple networks (Castells 2009: 42-7). Resistance takes the form of generating 
counter-power through networks by the same means, but it is precisely in the 
interconnection of the ICT and media trends that we described as central to the TMMC 
that movement actors gain the possibility for new forms of contestation (Castells 2009: 
47-53). It is, for Castells, the capacity for ‘mass self-communication’ - enabled by and 
intersecting with new media ecologies and digitization processes - that allows the 
generation of counter-power by global social movements (2015).  
Two elements are missing from this conception of power, however. First, we need a 
stronger recognition of the ways in which communicational power is shaped by other 
relations of power. Below, we briefly outline the ways in which the continuation of digital 
divides on the lines of gender, age, ethnicity, and class overlay ‘traditional’ power 
structures. Second, within Castells’ account of communicational power, the degree to 
which engaging (or refusing to engage) in mass self-communication ought to be 
understood as a cultural preference rooted in the cognitive and emotional characteristics 
of actors is curiously absent. Castells has occasionally been accused of technological 
determinism, although as we have already noted we do not think that charge is pertinent 
here. Nevertheless, if we wish to understand the operation of power in the TMMC we 
need to delineate the sources of preferences for engaging power in these ways, which are 
likely to be rooted in cultural formations, whether these are understood as ideologies, 
interpretative frames, collective identities, or discourses. This approach is usefully 
highlighted in work on the social forum movements in which it was clear that a ‘cultural 
logic of networking’ was a developing political and strategic preference among many 
participants (Juris 2008; Pleyers 2011). Further investigation of intertwining cultural 
formations and power structures is vital to a fuller understanding of the TMMC. 
From Cyberpolitics to Quotidian Technologies 
The development of new media and the internet has created new fields of contention 
over the governance of communication networks, the production of software, access to 
information and indeed the fundamentals of technological design (Jordan 2002, 2015; 
Kirkpatrick 2011). The creation of these new tools has inspired, and been inspired by, 
new forms of activism (Flesher Fominaya 2014: 135-137; Stalder 2010).  An important 
but not always explicit distinction in TMMC scholarship is that between the explicitly 
political use of digital tools in cyber and techno-political movements, and the increasingly 
ubiquitous and quotidian use of these tools in social movements in general. We use the 
term cyberpolitical movements to refer to movements who take the virtual arena as the 
central focus and purpose of their mobilization.  
Cyberpolitics can take many forms. At times, the focus is on technologically-mediated 
forms of action. The ‘hacktivism’ of early pioneers like the Electrohippies has its echoes in 
more recent groups such as Anonymous. Additionally, the creation of alternative citizen 
media of all kinds, digital guerilla communications advances, culture jamming, and 
whistleblowing (Baker & Blaagaard, 2016; Castells et al. 2006: 202-6; Carty, 2002; 
Coleman 2015) all offer forms of action dependent on digital savvy that could potentially 
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be applied with a wide range of political motives. More often, however, these techniques 
are used in connection with a cyberpolitical perspective in which movements are 
ideologically and practically committed to harnessing the emancipatory power of ICTs, 
and see cyberspace as a primary site of contention and mobilization. The development of 
a specific politics of information that is tied to the age of the internet has a number of 
important expressions in broader movements for ‘free culture’, free and open source 
software (F/OSS) and attempts to create and preserve a digital commons (Fuster Morell 
2012; Lessig 2002; Coleman 2012; Stalder 2010). The development of Pirate Parties in a 
number of European countries, and their success in Iceland (in which the Pirate Party is 
currently the third largest party) is instructive here (Leruth 2016). Standing on platforms 
centred on civic rights, information freedom, privacy, transparency, and a radically 
critical stance on copyright and patent laws, their main concerns mirror the cyberpolitics 
found in the kinds of movements noted above. They tend to carry too a (broadly 
libertarian) critique of representative democracy, arguing for the development of new 
technologically mediated forms of deliberation (Cammaerts 2015). This might help 
explain the particular popularity of the Icelandic Pirate Party, after an experimental, post-
crisis ‘crowd-sourced’ constitutional process gained widespread participation 
(Oddsdóttir 2014).  
The development of both new tactical or strategic possibilities and a new discourse of 
information politics is clearly a significant aspect of the developing TMMC. There is some 
connection here with the ‘hacker ethic’, the influence of which has been ethnographically 
explored among a range of groups from F/OSS programmers (Coleman 2012) to anti-war 
activists (Gillan 2008). We do not suggest either that the hacker ethic determines the 
content of cyberpolitics, nor that it is everywhere the same.  In Spain, for instance, the 
subfield of tecnopolitica or technopolitics exists as an activist and academic category that 
interrogates the nexus between digital imaginaries, digital technologies, and political 
action in social movements (Subirats et al. 2014; Monterde and Postill 2014; Blanco and 
Duarte 2011; Romanos and Sádaba 2015; Postill 2014, Casero-Ripollés and Feenstra 
2012, Feenstra and Casero-Ripollés 2014). Here we would expect a different political tilt 
to that described by Coleman (2012) for (mainly) US-based programmers, although the 
combination of political action with digitally-inscribed imaginaries is itself a common 
trait (Boler 2010; Coleman 2015; Jordan 2013, Pickerill 2003; Stalder 2010).  
The ideological components of cyberpolitics are enmeshed in wider ranging movement 
politics. Postill (2014), for example, points out the importance of various kinds of 
‘freedom technologists’ (from programmers to lawyers and journalists) in the 
development of 15-M. If we only look at those groups, however, it is tempting to read 15-
M as overly influenced by cyberpolitics, when of course its ideological and strategic 
characteristics drew from pre-existing movement cultures, the political history of Spain 
as well as the particular experience of economic crisis in that country (Flesher Fominaya 
2015, 2017). We think it likely that there is a multidirectional influence in terms of 
ideological and discursive resources as cyberpolitics bleeds into other movement spaces. 
Commitment to some of the values connected with the cyberpolitical realm can be 
evident without necessarily seeing the use of complex technologies. For example, activists 
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might recognize the strategic benefits of corporate owned social media but reject its use 
on ethical grounds (see Askanius and Gustafson 2010, Flesher Fominaya 2014). Likewise, 
some activist groups develop technical protocols for online political communication that 
include prohibitions on the circulation of news from corporate owned media sources. 
These ideological frameworks can lead groups sometimes to deliberately eschew more 
technologically sophisticated forms of action for ethical or strategic reasons (see 
Lievrouw 2011:173 – 174).  
Beyond cyberpolitics, the adoption of ICTs in movements may take many forms. Because 
digital technologies and media have also become a quotidian feature of so many people’s 
lives, understanding how activists navigate the TMMC in movements who do not 
prioritize the digital and virtual as political is equally important. Scholars have 
increasingly studied the use of ICTs as a quotidian and ubiquitous aspect of social 
movement communication processes across a wide range of issues not directly related to 
digital media and the politics of cyberspace, as well as its use and importance during 
episodes of mobilization by actors without specialized technical skills (e.g. Flesher 
Fominaya 2016; Tufekci and Wilson 2012; Ganesh and Stohl 2013; Milan 2013; Kavada 
2009; Fernandez-Planells, Figueras-Maz, and Pàmpols 2014, Nielsen 2013). Ganesh and 
Stohl (2013) describe digital media ubiquity in Occupy Wellington, in which activists 
drew on multiple digital sources of information, and activists’ personal networks were 
intricately embedded in digital media use. As Mattoni (this issue) and Nielsen (2011) 
argue, we still know relatively little about the relationships between the routine use of 
digital tools and political agency in citizens' decisions to join or participate in movements 
or politics. Liu (this issue) offers an analysis of the mundane digital media use in 
everyday resistance in China, and like Nielsen (2011) and Ganesh and Stohl (2013), 
highlights the deep integration of such use into recruiting and mobilizing practices. An 
adequate understanding of the TMMC clearly needs both kinds of research focus. 
Additionally, the degree to which cyberpolitics influences or is influenced by the 
everyday use of ICTs in social movements is another potentially fruitful area of inquiry. 
The role of hackers and cyber-activists in the recent wave of Occupy type movements is, 
for instance, understudied (but see Romanos and Sádaba 2015), with most scholars 
focusing on the ubiquitous/quotidian elements of digital media use (e.g. Fernandez-
Planells, Figueras-Maz, and Pàmpols 2014; Ganesh and Stohl 2013).  
Exclusions and divisions in the age of new media 
Claims that new media use is ‘ubiquitous’ in some sectors of the population need to be 
tempered by an awareness of the continuing existence of digital divides that cut across 
social movements. This has implications for research methods as well as for the 
evaluation of the causes, dynamics, and impacts of new media use for social movements.  
If ‘ubiquity’ is understood as ICT use spreading across whole societies, it is highly 
misleading and needs to be interrogated. In the UK, for example, Ofcom’s report on media 
literacy noted that 13% of adults do not use the internet at all (Ofcom 2016: 23-5). Non-
usage is clearly patterned by age, with 33% of over 65s (rising to 65% of over 75s) 
reporting that they never use the internet. Volume of internet use is also patterned: 
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younger, wealthier people on average spend much longer online than older or poorer 
people and engage in a wider variety of activities (Ofcom 2016: 23-5). Around 70% of 
internet users in the UK have a social media profile, which usually means Facebook. While 
Twitter has become an incredibly popular research tool, it is a relatively peculiar pastime. 
In comparing Twitter use in the UK and US, Blank (2016) finds that not only are Twitter 
users in both countries younger and wealthier than other internet users (and hence even 
more so compared with the wider population), but they are more likely to be members of 
elites and have characteristically different attitudes and behaviours than the wider 
populations.  
Moreover, while British and American Twitter users share some characteristics, there are 
cross-country differences too, especially pertaining to ethnicity. Not only do Twitter users 
not represent the wider population, but different national Twitter populations cannot be 
taken as representative of each other. These insights have important implications for 
social movement research using social media data. To take one example: the importance 
of 'hashtag activism' to the development of Black Lives Matter in the USA has been widely 
discussed in terms of its temporalities, its capacity to enable the emergence of a public 
counter-discourse, and its creation of solidarities (Bonilla and Rosa 2015, Freelon, 
McIlwain and Clark 2016, Jackson and Welles 2016). From a TMMC perspective, however, 
what is consequential here is that #BLM did not spring from a virtual or de-
contextualised tabula rasa, but rather from a specific set of patterned relationships 
between black subcultures, mainstream media practices, and social media use. Blacks in 
the USA are disproportionately high users of Twitter, to the extent that we can talk of the 
emergence of a 'Black Twitter', fuelled by the technological development of hashtags and 
trending topics on the Twitter interface. Brock (2012) accordingly positions twitter as a 
cultural rather than social network, in which hashtags operate simultaneously as sign, 
signifier and signified, particularly through their performative structuring as 'call-and 
response' by Black Twitter users. The Twitter interface thus indirectly enables Black 
interventions into White public space. 
Only when we grasp the interplay between these elements can we avoid the pitfalls of 
what Melucci (1994) calls ‘the myopia of the visible’, namely the tendency to focus on the 
most visible and easily measured aspects of mobilization, while neglecting the cultural 
codes and practices that generate them. The methodological point is that studying online 
participation exclusively cannot tell us anything about non-participation; it only captures 
the behaviour of those who are already participating (Flesher Fominaya 2016, Tufekci 
2014a). This makes it harder to explore factors that inhibit online participation, a key 
issue for social movements seeking to maximize the democratic potential of ICTs (Flesher 
Fominaya 2016). Studies based on online participation data need, therefore, to be 
carefully delimited. Online participation should not be taken as a proxy or indicator of 
movement organization or mobilization strength, and online forms of mobilization need 
to be clearly distinguished from offline forms of mobilization. One illustrative example 
comes from the relation between Twitter use and mobilization. Much has been made of 
the role of Twitter in Spain's 15-M/Indignados movement (see e.g. López et al 2014), yet 
the 2013 data for Spain shows that Twitter users represented 15% of the total Internet 
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user population and 4% of the total population, with an average age of 22.6 for Twitter 
users, according to Peer Reach.3 This does not mean Twitter is irrelevant or unimportant; 
quite the contrary. Activists with effective communication strategies are aware of the 
problems caused by social media ‘echo chambers’ and the need to break through the 
social media barrier to connect to mass media outlets which will then broadcast 
movement messages beyond the limited Twitter-sphere. Twitter is also a crucial 
communication resource during intense periods of mobilization. But recognition of the 
limits of the Twitter-sphere and its problematic relation to offline mobilization is 
necessary for activists and scholars. Calls to street protest, for example, might become a 
trending topic on Twitter, but not yield the necessary or anticipated bodies on the street. 
In a similar vein, Morozov (2011) argues that activist focus on online tools can distract 
them from effectively engaging in those actions needed to realize significant or lasting 
political change (see also Dean 2009). 
There is not necessarily a direct correlation, therefore, between online and offline 
participation, a fact that can be overlooked when all that is being measured is online 
participation. Selecting successful cases where intense online mobilization is 
accompanied by intense offline mobilization can further reinforce the idea the social 
media use is driving mobilization processes. As Castells argued in the midst of the hoopla 
around ‘Twitter Revolutions’ during the Arab Uprisings, ‘obviously communication 
technologies did not give birth to the insurgency’ (Castells, quoted in Khondker 2011: 
678). It is obvious, but sometimes easy to forget, that ‘ICTs do not cause revolutions, deep 
seated structural problems, mass grievances and people willing and able to act 
collectively do’ (Flesher Fominaya 2014: 166). What is also often overlooked is how often 
social movement media campaigns fail to create resonance and impact in a media 
environment full of competing demands for attention and the continuing presence of 
other powerful voices with greater access to the public.  
These comments highlight that while social media research is essential, one needs to be 
very careful in constructing research designs that rely exclusively on social media data 
(see also Tufekci 2014b). Attempts to represent a wider population statistically will be 
problematic and claims made on the basis of this data needs suitable caveats. Contentious 
political activity on either Twitter or Facebook is undoubtedly intrinsically interesting, 
but using social media as either the only source of data, or as a single starting point (e.g. 
providing a sampling frame of people or events) means limiting one’s claims about the 
TMMC precisely to active users of those platforms. Fortunately, emerging scholarship in 
this area offers many valuable contributions to the literature, including the work of 
Ahmed et al., Hensby and Pavan in this issue.  
It is clear that social media activity in particular, or online activity in general, is not 
ubiquitous in the sense that it is used by all social groups: usage is uneven in spread and 
heterogeneous in character. It is the case, however, that ICTs can have a different kind of 
ubiquity in which they are becoming present everywhere in the lives of those who engage 
                                                        
3 For details: https://peerreach.com/ 
 Cristina Flesher Fominaya & Kevin Gillan, 2017  19 
with them. That is to say, while ICTs are not socially ubiquitous, they may be personally 
ubiquitous: for those who almost always have internet access, online services can become 
the first point of call for crucial information and communication tasks. This is why Liu 
(this issue) proposes a research programme focused on the ‘politics of mundanity’, in 
which it is recognised that explosive contentious ‘moments of madness’ cannot be 
explained without reference to the continuous presence of political online expression that 
has (for some groups of the population) become a constant presence in daily life. The 
personally ubiquitous character of ICTs is also likely to be especially important with 
respect to those movement groups that are most clearly intertwined with technology and 
the politics of cyberspace. Ganesh and Stohl (2013:425) argue that ‘digital ubiquity marks 
the onset of a profound hybridity rather than an abrupt change in activist organizing 
practices’. In other words, many activists integrate new tools into existing repertoires of 
action, rather than radically altering their practices as a result of new technology. This is 
partly because as they and others have noted (Bimber et al 2012; Flesher Fominaya 2016; 
Lovink 2011) when technologies become so integrated into daily life as to no longer seem 
remarkable, people stop being as reflexive about their use. This can pose important 
problems for activism and scholarship on activism with regard to navigating the TMMC 
(Flesher Fominaya 2016). We highlight a few of these issues in the next section.  
Digitally enabled divides within activist communities  
Rethinking digitally enabled divides requires paying attention to the ways technology and 
media use can be at the centre of diverse forms of divisions within social movement 
communities. As Flesher Fominaya (2016) argues there is a tendency to neglect the 
emotional and subjective aspects of ICT use in favour of their technological aspects (i.e. 
costs, affordances, and leveraging). In addition, with some exceptions  (e.g. Cronaeur, 
2004; Horton, 2004; Pickerill, 2004; Kavada, 2007, 2009, 2010) little attention has been 
paid to the impact of ICTs on the internal communication and cohesion of face-to-face 
social movement groups. This deficit means we have insufficient knowledge of the way 
technology and media use is experienced subjectively by activists and how this affects 
social movement processes such as communication, cohesion, collective identity 
formation, frustration, and burnout. A key emerging area of research studies the role of 
digital technologies and digitally mediated communication in fostering or hindering 
social movement groups’ ability to meet their ideological commitments to such values as 
democratic or horizontal participation, openness, transparency, and collaboration, goals 
that are often tied into the emancipatory digital imaginaries of the groups themselves 
(see e.g. Flesher Fominaya 2016; Hensby, this issue; Uitermark, this issue; Romanos and 
Sádaba 2015, Nielsen 2013).  
A related issue is the role of status inequalities and power as it flows through movement 
spaces and is mediated by technology. Two of the key areas in this regard are the role of 
technological expertise, and gender. Attention to the former reveals how technological 
expertise can and does influence access to and control of technology and media, which 
can and does create important hierarchies within social movement communities, as well 
as affecting the closed or open nature of internal movement organizational dynamics 
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(Juris et al. 2013; Pickerill 2003; Costanza-Chock 2012; Flesher Fominaya 2016). This 
digital divide can also intersect with other divides such as age (e.g. where older activists 
who may be less digitally connected or savvy feel left out when groups rely exclusively or 
unreflexively on technologically mediated forms of communication), gender (e.g. in 
hacker or radical geek spaces in which women are still minorities and face significant 
sexism), or economic inequality (e.g. where some members do not have constant access 
to the internet or mobile phones). Attention to gender reveals how it shapes patterns of 
mediated interaction which can marginalize, silence, delegitimize or exclude women’s 
voices (and privilege male authority), as well as how digitally mediated interactions in 
cyberspace are often extremely hostile for women (and people of colour) further 
decreasing participation and affecting their possibilities for leadership, representation, 
and expression. Dahlberg (2001: 623), for example, highlights the problems stemming 
from a lack of reflexivity in cyber-deliberations, including the failure to achieve respectful 
listening or commitment to difference, the dominance of discussion by few individuals 
and groups, and exclusions because of social inequalities.  
Perhaps due to a lingering hangover from early techno-optimism, there is still a 
widespread tendency to assume that the internet is somehow either inherently 
democratic, or else that it is a neutral autonomous sphere, despite clear evidence to the 
contrary. The gendered digital divide is also extremely pronounced within the 
communities that paradoxically offer the greatest opportunity for harnessing the power 
of the digital for progressive social change: the civic-technology and open source 
community.  Not only are women woefully underrepresented in technology engineering 
and coding, but they are also silenced within the that community through the privileging 
of male voices and the value placed on male dominated roles (Maidaborn 2014). The 
pervasive sexism that penetrates cyber-activist spaces on and offline is clearly an area of 
the TMMC that needs to be reflexively and critically analysed. Reflexivity about power 
then, within and beyond digital activist communities, is crucial. So too is research on the 
ways that activists are trying to overcome these divides and maximize the potential 
offered by the TMMC. Understanding the ways that digital divides signal the intersection 
of traditional power dynamics with the dynamics of the TMMC would go a long way to 
rectifying some of the deficiencies in Castell’s treatment of power, which we described 
above, as well as combating narratives that tend to flatten or neutralize power differences 
in virtual spaces. 
Conclusions 
We started this article by highlighting the interconnections between research in the fields 
of technology, media, and social movements, and have offered an overview of key ways 
these broad fields come together to provide new knowledge of social movement 
dynamics. But there is much more to do to understand the dynamics of the TMMC. 
Drawing on the conceptual clarifications and advances provided above, we now identify 
six broad challenges on which further attention may generate a research programme 
capable of transcending the current ‘state of the art’.  
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First, we need to pay more attention to power. On the one hand, that means more 
concerted focus on the political economy of media and technology in order to better 
understand issues of the access to, control of, and surveillance of the means by which 
movements are mediated. On the other, it means examining the multiple ways power 
imbalances ‘in real life’ can be reproduced, manifested, and magnified online (see e.g. 
Flesher Fominaya 2016) and how these traverse activist spaces and strategies, with 
crucial implications for participation, marginalization, inclusion, and voice.  
Second, we need to pay much more attention to the lived experience of the use of digital 
tools. Digital mediation affects both the internal life of social movements as they 
communicate, deliberate, and organise, and the ‘public face’ of movements as they 
interact with broader media ecologies. Both forms of mediation are shaped by culture, 
emotions, gender, technological savvy, and human-technology interaction. A balanced 
approach to culture and material life is required to understand decisions to adopt or 
adapt certain forms of media and technology and to trace the way these decisions impact 
social movement dynamics, including cohesion, conflict, collective identity formation, and 
internal and external communicational and organizational strategies.  
Third, we need to recognize the specificities of the media ecologies in which social 
movements operate, especially in local and national settings. Activists able to draw on a 
rich network of autonomous media resources and count on a developed critical media 
sphere (despite limitations posed by corporate owned mass media), for example, are 
likely to fare better with well-developed communicational strategies than activists who 
might be as technologically and politically savvy but face a harsher, less forgiving media 
climate. Activists’ digital cultural repertoires likewise will influence the uptake or 
rejection of certain media technologies as much as or more than affordances.  
Fourth, we need to recognize the importance of ideational frameworks and political 
priorities in influencing technology and media use in social movements. This means 
recognizing that technology itself is neither value-neutral nor value-laden, but can be 
harnessed by actors of all persuasions and intents. While some movement action might 
be driven by the excitement of novel technologies or because the manifest functionalities 
of those technologies fit their organisational form, others are much more embedded in 
the ideological commitments of activist groups, independently of the specific affordances 
of particular technologies.  
In each of these areas, further empirical research would help us to get beyond pointing to 
the complexity of interactions within the TMMC, to specifying sets of cultural, material, 
and social conditions that in combination generate patterns of action. Doing so 
successfully may depend on a fifth core challenge: we need to expand and revise our 
methodological and ethical protocols to take into account the interpenetration of 
technological and social processes in so many areas of collective political action. This is in 
part due to the very nature of the data we are faced with analysing, which as Coleman 
(2010: 494) highlights, presents researchers with the challenge of ‘how to collect and 
represent forms of digital data whose social and material life are often infused with 
elements of anonymity, modalities of hypermobility, ephemerality, and mutability’. At the 
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same time we need to be critical and cautious about enthusiastic claims about ‘the power 
of’ the internet, social media, and digital technologies when assessing causality and 
outcomes, as we have argued throughout. The allure of ‘big data’ in enabling large-scale 
quantitative analysis has caused considerable excitement in some parts of the social 
sciences, but we have expressed some caution above about the danger of reinforcing an 
excessively individual-centred approach to collective action. Given that access to ‘big 
data’ is typically through powerful corporations or agents of state, we must also be 
mindful of the same kinds of ethical challenge that activists face in considering the 
adoption of particular tools (Gillan 2014).  
Our sixth and final challenge is more theoretical in nature. The field of social movement 
studies has built up a set of conceptual tools that predate the digital era. We are confident 
most of these existing concepts are quite robust, but we should subject them to scrutiny 
and modification as necessary when transferring them to the TMMC. The concept of 
collective identity is a good example, having often been conceived as a process that 
requires face-to-face interaction. Despite this, re-interrogations of the concept have found 
that it continues to be relevant and useful even in social movements that mobilize almost 
entirely online, such as Anonymous (Firer-Blaess 2016, Flesher Fominaya forthcoming). 
We believe rising to these challenges is necessary for the further development of TMMC 
research, which would in turn mark a positive development for social movement 
scholarship as a whole.   
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